BackgroundBiobanking biospecimens and consent are common practice in paediatric research. We need to explore children and young people’s (CYP) knowledge and perspectives around the use of and consent to biobanking. This will ensure meaningful informed consent can be obtained and improve current consent procedures.MethodsWe designed a survey, in co-production with CYP, collecting demographic data, views on biobanking, and consent using three scenarios: 1) prospective consent, 2) deferred consent, and 3) reconsent and assent at age of capacity. The survey was disseminated (...) via the Young Person’s Advisory Group North England (YPAGne) and participating CYP’s secondary schools. Data were analysed using a qualitative thematic approach by three independent reviewers (including CYP) to identify common themes. Data triangulation occurred independently by a fourth reviewer.ResultsOne hundred two CYP completed the survey. Most were between 16–18 years (63.7%, N = 65) and female (66.7%, N = 68). 72.3% had no prior knowledge of biobanking (N = 73).Acceptability of prospective consent for biobanking was high (91.2%, N = 93) with common themes: ‘altruism’, ‘potential benefits outweigh individual risk’, 'frugality', and ‘(in)convenience’.Deferred consent was also deemed acceptable in the large majority (84.3%, N = 86), with common themes: ‘altruism’, ‘body integrity’ and ‘sample frugality’. 76.5% preferred to reconsent when cognitively mature enough to give assent (N = 78), even if parental consent was previously in place. 79.2% wanted to be informed if their biobanked biospecimen is reused (N = 80).ConclusionProspective and deferred consent acceptability for biobanking is high among CYP in the UK. Altruism, frugality, body integrity, and privacy are the most important themes. Clear communication and justification are paramount to obtain consent. Any CYP with capacity should be part of the consenting procedure, if possible. (shrink)

Marx und die "bürgerliche" Nationalökonomie, von G. Aspelin.--Några textkritiska problem i Berkeleyforskningen, av B. Belfrage.--Några kommentarer till C.L. Stevensons teori om etisk oenighet, av L. Befgström.--Viljeteorins premisser, av J. Evers.--Axel Hägerströms analys av värdeupplevelsen, av L. Fröström.--On archetypical performatives, by M. Furberg.--The better something is, the worse its absence, by S. Halldén.--Ett slags representationsteorem för deontisk logik, av B. Hansson.--Om Platons "Euthyphron," av I. Hedenius.--Tolkningssatsernas logik, av G. Hermerén.--Är verkligheten motsägande? Ett dialektiskt argument, av K. Marc-Wogau.--Moral, amoral og indifferens, av (...) H. Ofstad.--Begreppet "property" hos John Locke, av K. Olivecrona.--En skademodell, av U. Persson.--Objektivitet som kunskaps teoretiskt begepp och som värderingsideal, av H. Regnéll.--Satsen "Flickan F är vacker," av E. Ryding.--Lathund för lagläsare, av T. Strömberg. (shrink)

The superlative quantifiers, at least and at most, are commonly assumed to have the same truth-conditions as the comparative quantifiers more than and fewer than. However, as Geurts & Nouwen have demonstrated, this is wrong, and several theories have been proposed to account for them. In this paper we propose that superlative quantifiers are illocutionary operators; specifically, they modify meta-speech acts.Meta speech-acts are operators that do not express a speech act, but a willingness to make or refrain from making a (...) certain speech act. The classic example is speech act denegation, e.g. I don't promise to come, where the speaker is explicitly refraining from performing the speech act of promising What denegations do is to delimit the future development of conversation, that is, they delimit future admissible speech acts. Hence we call them meta-speech acts. They are not moves in a game, but rather commitments to behave in certain ways in the future. We formalize the notion of meta speech acts as commitment development spaces, which are rooted graphs: The root of the graph describes the commitment development up to the current point in conversation; the continuations from the root describe the admissible future directions.We define and formalize the meta-speech act GRANT, which indicates that the speaker, while not necessarily subscribing to a proposition, refrains from asserting its negation. We propose that superlative quantifiers are quantifiers over GRANTs. Thus, Mary petted at least three rabbits means that the minimal number n such that the speaker GRANTs that Mary petted n rabbits is n = 3. In other words, the speaker denies that Mary petted two, one, or no rabbits, but GRANTs that she petted more.We formalize this interpretation of superlative quantifiers in terms of commitment development spaces, and show how the truth conditions that are derived from it are partly entailed and partly conversationally implicated. We demonstrates how the theory accounts for a wide variety of phenomena regarding the interpretation of superlative quantifiers, their distribution, and the contexts in which they can be embedded. (shrink)

Im Rahmen einer Erörterung der Philosophie J.G. Fichtes liegt die wissenschaftliche Bedeutung J.B. Schads nicht darin, daß dieser besonders scharfsinnig interpretierend oder kommentierend an die Wissenschaftslehre herangegangen sei. Das weist er selbst ausdrücklich von sich. Vielmehr kann die philosophische Leistung Schads, die es rechtfertigt, auf einem Fichte-Kongreß auch auf ihn näher einzugehen, darin gesehen werden, daß er als erster den Versuch macht, die Philosophie Fichtes nicht nur allgemeinverständlich darzustellen, sondern sie auch relativ frei aus sich selbst heraus nachzuentwickeln.

Im Rahmen einer Erörterung der Philosophie J.G. Fichtes liegt die wissenschaftliche Bedeutung J.B. Schads nicht darin, daß dieser besonders scharfsinnig interpretierend oder kommentierend an die Wissenschaftslehre herangegangen sei. Das weist er selbst ausdrücklich von sich. Vielmehr kann die philosophische Leistung Schads, die es rechtfertigt, auf einem Fichte-Kongreß auch auf ihn näher einzugehen, darin gesehen werden, daß er als erster den Versuch macht, die Philosophie Fichtes nicht nur allgemeinverständlich darzustellen, sondern sie auch relativ frei aus sich selbst heraus nachzuentwickeln.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:25. HUME'S ANTINOMIES I There are many contradictions in Hume. So much is readily admitted by all Hume scholars. But there is little agreement on what these contradictions show about Hume's thought in general. Many interpretations are based upon the view that Hume's contradictions are signs of his carelessness or lack of thoroughness. He is seen either as having lost all interest in giving a comprehensive or consistent account (...) of human nature or as not having pushed far enough his analysis of the philosophical problems facing him. Other interpretations suggest that Hume, the "skeptic," has recklessly introduced these contradictions in order to confuse us. He is perhaps not altogether serious and is laughing at those who take too serious a view of the "science" of metaphysics and his own contribution 2 to it. Others again argue that the contradictions (or some fundamental class of them) are the consequence of Hume's philosophical presuppositions or his psychological method. Given his particular beliefs and his method, these contradictions had to arise with logical necessity. However, the general opinion seems to be that, if Hume is not to be dismissed as a merely negative skeptic whose philosophy is of no great consequence, he needs to be excused or defended, i.e. his contradictions, which are 4 seen as "inconsistencies," have to be explained away. His discussions of the self, causality, substance, or the relationship of reason and the passions must be, and — it is believed — can be shown not to be contradictory, if all the relevant factors are considered. However, reconstructions of Hume's analysis of the self or causality, for instance, which involve the explaining away of contradictions soon find themselves in a rather peculiar quandary, since they also have to show that Hume's own admissions of the contradictory nature of his analysis is mistaken. Such "defenses" issue only in other 26. accusations, namely that Hume, in addition to not having expressed himself very clearly in his writings, failed to understand them himself when he referred back to them. If only for this reason, I think that interpretations which involve an explaining away or minimizing of the contradictions in Hume are suspect. It is my opinion that Hume needs no such defenses or excuses -- at least not in so far as the most important contradictions are concerned. On the contrary, I believe that Hume can be understood properly, only if we take full account of them. I want in this paper to argue that there is in Hume a fundamental class of contradictions which he believed were neither accidental nor created by his analysis, but were essential characteristics of the human mind. The contradictions uncovered by his analysis can be understood only if they are recognised as one aspect of a more complex problematic. They must have a "deeper" significance for Hume because they are the symptoms of the infirmities... which are common to human nature (T265). These are 'Hume's 7 "antinomies. " In this analysis I have allowed myself to be guided by a more or less Kantian conception of "antinomy" and "antinomical." In fact, I believe that there is a definite similarity between Kant's doctrine of the "Antinomy of Pure Reason" and Hume's "operations" which are equally natural and necessary in the human mind, yet in some circumstances... directly contrary (T266). But the present paper is not so much a sustained comparison of Hume and Kant in this regard as it is an attempt to elucidate the g peculiar nature of several contradictions in Hume. For I believe that, if we have a better understanding of the nature of these contradictions, we will also be able to say something more definite about Hume's theory of mental activity and certain aspects of the relationship of skepticism and naturalism (or: Pyrrhonism and Newtonianism, destructive and constructive side, negative and positive phase, etc.) in his thought. To this end, I shall first 27. explain what I mean by "antinomy" here. Secondly, I shall show in what sense Hume was aware of having discovered something very much like an antinomical dimension in human nature, and, finally, I shall offer some suggestions as to the relevance of this... (shrink)

There are a number of well-known restrictions for the Dative Alternation (cf. Green (1974), Oehrle (1976), Gropen, Pinker, Hollander, & Goldberg (1989), Pinker (1989), Pesetsky (1992), Levin (1993). I will show that several of the low-level semantic restrictions are consequences of a more general one involving the incorporation of a manner component into the meaning of the verb. These restrictions can be explained by assuming two distinct representations of verbs participating in the Dative Alternation: The PO frame expresses movement of (...) an object t o a g o a l , the DO frame implies a change of possession. I will argue that these restrictions cannot be expressed in a syntactic representation of lexical meaning as in Pinker (1989) and Hale & Keyser (1993). (shrink)

David Lewis proposed to deal with the semantics of sentences that state what is possible for an individual in terms of possible individuals that are in ways the first individual might have been, so called counterparts of the individual. In this book, I defend counterpart semantics as an approach to the semantics of modality and natural language semantics in particular. Counterpart semantics has a rival, the standard Kripkean semantics that deals with the same sentences in terms of an accessibility relation (...) between possible worlds. While counterpart semantics appears to be more flexible and carries less metaphysical presuppositions (it does not presuppose that I myself exist in various possible worlds, e.g.), Kripkean semantics has some advantages of its own. Most importantly, it incorporates the core assumptions of what may be called standard possible-worlds semantics; i.e. the core assumptions of the most successful framework within linguistic semantics. Counterpart semantics, on the other hand, does not conform to these assumptions, or so I will argue. In this book I opt for a synthesis of these two approaches that allows to combine their advantages. In Chap.1 I introduce the basic idea of counterpart semantics. I defend counterparts against the charge, made by Kripke, that counterparts are irrelevant for the analysis of modality. In Chap. 2 I present the classical version of counterpart semantics, i.e. David Lewis's translation of the language of quantified modal logic into counterpart theory. I discuss some well-known problems and opt for a revision of that translation that is able to solve the problems. Lewis's translation indirectly defines semantical values for expressions of quantified modal logic. In Chap.3 I evaluate counterpart semantics with respect to basic features of possible-worlds semantics. I conclude that the semantical values indirectly assigned to sentences by Lewis's translation are not sets of possible worlds, and that they do not meet certain intuitive demands on notions of meaning and content. (The revisions proposed in Chap.2 do not change this.) In Chap.4 I discuss various versions of a combination of counterpart semantics with Kripkean semantics found in the literature. But I conclude that here, the benefits of the latter are achieved by forfeiting the advantages of the former. Chap.5 finally contains my own proposal how to combine the two approaches in a more satisfactory way. The core semantical notion is truth according to a maximal complete representation, where representations now play the role of worlds. It is an important feature of the counterpart relation that it is qualitative, i.e. a relation in which things stand in virtue how they are. In Chap.1 I point out why it is qualitative, and why it ought to be. In Chap.6 I show how to make the notion of a qualitative property or relation precise. Finally, in Chap.7 I show how to extend this and related notions to predicates and propositions. For counterpart semantics to work at all we have to assume that everything that can be said at all can in principle be expressed in a language with qualitative predicates only (and perhaps, additionally, names, treated directly referentially). In Chap.7 I show how this assumption allows to maintain that the representations of our semantics deserve their name. (shrink)

In the 1960s, a school formed in Heidelberg around Dieter Henrich that criticized—with reference to J. G. Fichte—the ‘reflection model’ of self-consciousness according to which self-consciousness consists in a representational relation between two mental states or the self-representation of a mental state. I present a new “Heidelberg perspective” of pre-reflective self-consciousness. According to this new approach, self-consciousness occurs in two varieties which regularly are not sufficiently distinguished: The first variety is egological self-consciousness that exists in connection with the use of (...) concepts. It consists in the consciousness of having an awareness of oneself as the Ego of a conscious state. The second variety is anonymous pre-reflective self-consciousness, which is awareness of consciousness but does not contain egological information. The pre-reflective self-consciousness does not exhibit a subject-object structure and thus cannot be appropriately determined as a representation, self-representation, or even acquaintance relation. Rather, anonymous self-consciousness is characterized by an indistinction of subject and object. However, pre-reflective self-consciousness is the basis of egological self-consciousness. (shrink)

The paper first presents a short survey of ancient and modern logical, rhetorical and argumentative approaches (e.g. Aristotle, Quintilian, Quine, Anscombre and Ducrot) studying the properties of paradoxical utterances. This survey is followed by a tentative definition of paradoxes as seemingly contradictory utterances triggering conversational implicatures in the sense of Grice. A specific group of paradoxes, namely, persuasive paradoxes, is further characterized by the specific implicatures which they trigger: the implicatures of persuasive paradoxes serve the interest of the (political) speaker (...) because they either convey a sharp criticism of the political opponent(s) or praise the political activities of the speaker in a highly effective way.The second part of the paper takes a corpus of about 80 paradoxical utterances from Cicero's speeches to show how they are used 1. for a devastating criticism of Cicero's political enemies, 2. a milder form of criticism in the case of his friends, when their political activities have failed, 3. a praise of successful policies of Cicero and his political friends and 4. a defense of unsuccessful activities started by Cicero and his friends. (shrink)

Die Studie versucht, das Politische als ein zwischenmenschliches Urteilshandeln zu erklären. Der Urteilstypus, der dem zugrundeliegen muß, wird systematisch ausgewiesen und - neben den Leuten selbst - der Philosophie, Politischen Theorie, Rechtswissenschaft und auch Theologie vorgelegt.Anlaß und Stoff für die Beweisführung bildet die Berliner Diskussion über die Möglichkeiten menschlicher Rationalität um J. G. Fichte und seine vielfältigen Kritiker, darunter Carl Schmitt. Durch die Art, wie der untersuchte Urteilstypus aus sich heraus Einheit und Kraft gewinnt und so kommunikativ zu wirken vermag, (...) ergibt sich ein neues Bild von Demokratie-Theorie: Das Politische ist wesentlich unvertretbar; die Urteilenden selber sinnen einander Einsatz an und rufen sich zur Entscheidung auf. So wird man Bürger.Im Sinn einer solchen nicht von bloß privaten Interessen bestimmten Gemeinschaftlichkeit wurde Fichte insbesondere in China aufgenommen, als es sich in Begegnung mit Berliner Philosophie zu erneuern begann. Das vorliegende Buch erinnert auch an dieses Stück gemeinsamer Zukunft. (shrink)

English summary: A commentary on Spinoza's final work, Tractatus Politicus has until recently remained a desideratum. In contrast to his metaphysics and his philosophy of religion, Spinoza's theories on politics, the state and law have received little attention in the German-speaking countries. It's only recently that Spinoza's political philosophy again become widely discussed in Germany. Having established the role of political philosophy and working always within the context of Spinoza's complete work, this volume comments firstly on Spinoza's theory on the (...) natural genesis of law and the state, including the foundations of political philosophy, the relationship between natural and national law and the theory of sovereignty and international relations. Continuing on this basis it moves on to his concept for the optimization of the system of political and legal institutions in all three forms of government. Finally, there is an analysis of the current relevance of Spinoza's thought and its impact on current debate. The work includes contributions by Tilman Altwicker, Wolfgang Bartuschat, Tobias Herbst, Gunnar Hindrichs, Rainer Keil, Stephan Kirste, Martin Leiner, Oliver W. Lembcke, Tilman Reitz and Manfred Walther. German description: Ein Kommentar zu Spinozas letztem Werk Tractatus politicus war bislang ein Desiderat. Spinozas Theorie der Politik, des Staates und des Rechts ist anders als seine Metaphysik und seine Religionsphilosophie im deutschsprachigen Bereich lange wenig beachtet worden. Erst in jungerer Zeit ist die Beschaftigung mit Spinozas politischer Philosophie auch in Deutschland wieder intensiver geworden. Nach einer Bestimmung des Ortes der Politischen Philosophie und stets im Kontext von Spinozas Gesamtwerk kommentiert der Band zunachst Spinozas Theorie der naturlichen Genese von Recht und Staat, so die Grundlagen der politischen Philosophie, das Verhaltnis von naturlichem und staatlichem Recht, die Theorie der Souveranitat und der internationalen Beziehungen. Auf dieser Grundlage folgt dann seine Konzeption einer Optimierung des Systems politisch-rechtlicher Institutionen fur alle drei Regierungsformen. Abschliessend werden die Aktualitat des Denkens Spinozas und sein Einfluss auf gegenwartige Debatten analysiert. Mit Beitragen von: Tilman Altwicker, Wolfgang Bartuschat, Tobias Herbst, G unnar Hindrichs, Rainer Keil, Stephan Kirste, Martin Leiner, Oliver W. Lembcke, Tilman Reitz, Manfred Walther. (shrink)

This comprehensive collection offers a unique look at nursing practice, theory, research and nursing history from various critical theoretical perspectives. It aims to initiate an international discussion among scholars from diverse countries, particularly Germany and Anglo-American countries, coming from distinctive schools of thought, e.g. German Critical theory and Post-structural approaches, and influenced by their respective histories of sciences. This book analyzes and criticizes nursing theory, nursing research and practice along several dimensions: Nursing Ethics, Subjectivity, Body and Flesh (Leib), Technology, Power, (...) History, and Education. (shrink)

The works of Dieter Henrich and Manfred Frank argue that consciousness is fundamentally a self-awareness antecedent to reflection. This essay picks up the suggestion that consciousness itself is a field or medium of manifestation. As such it is a “metafact,” the anonymity of which transcendental philosophy seeks to overcome. This is required because the “facts” of the light of the mind and the intelligibility of what the mind discloses elude philosophical investigation as long as the anonymity reigns. Clarifying self-consciousness (...) illuminates what essentially must elude normal categorial and predicative investigation which presuppose the light of the mind and intelligibility. The seemingly esoteric issue of the discovery of the primacy of the pre- or non-reflective self-presence at the foundation of first-person reference may be said to found metaphysics in so far as this requires evidence for the inseparability of being from manifestation. (shrink)

This article takes stock of the basic notions of Information Structure (IS). It first provides a general characterization of IS following Chafe (1976) within a communicative model of Common Ground (CG), which distinguishes between CG content and CG management. IS is concerned with those features of language that concern the local CG. It then defines and discusses the notions of Focus (as indicating alternatives) and its various uses, Givenness (as indicating that a denotation is already present in the CG), and (...) Topic (as specifying what an statement is about). It also proposes a new notion, Delimitation, which comprises contrastive topics and frame setters, and indicates that the current conversational move does not satisfy the local communicative needs totally. It also points out that the rhetorical structuring partly belongs to IS. (shrink)

The studies in this 1996 volume consider Hegel's mature views on ethics and politics and relate them to the classical tradition of Western political thought. Manfred Tiedel brings to the analysis of Hegel's views a high level of scholarship and a thorough knowledge of earlier thinkers. Concentrating on the Philosophy of Right, he reveals connections which clarify Hegel's understanding of his relationship with his predecessors and of the transformation of political philosophy which Hegel wanted to effect. In doing so, (...) he throws much needed light on the structure of Hegel's work and on many of its more obscure doctrines concerning natural law, political economy, civil society and the state. Professor Riedel's work is highly regarded in Germany. The translation of these essays will provide a valuable counterpart to the approach of most English-speaking scholars and will help significantly to extend the understanding and appreciation of Hegel's political philosophy. (shrink)

Als »Subjektphilosophie« hat man das neuzeitliche Denken insgesamt charakterisiert. Diese Auszeichnung verdankt das Subjekt der verwegenen Hoffnung, es eigne sich zum ultimativen Prinzip der Wissensbegründung. Das Interesse an einer Aufklärung seiner Struktur wurde dadurch jedoch in den Hintergrund gedrängt. Diese Struktur steht im Zentrum von Manfred Franks jüngstem Buch, das einen Blick auf die moderne Geschichte der Subjekttheorien mit Analysen der inneren Beschaffenheit und der Zeitlichkeit des Subjekts sowie seines Verhältnisses zur Intersubjektivität und einer Auseinandersetzung mit klassischen und neuesten (...) analytischen Theoriebildungen verbindet. Dem Begriff der Präreflexivität kommt dabei die Schlüsselrolle zu. (shrink)

Originally presented as the author's thesis (doctoral)--Freie Universitèat Berlin.

Using game theory and examples of actual games people play, Nobel laureate Manfred Eigen and Ruthild Winkler show how the elements of chance and rules underlie ...